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ECONOMIC THEORY AND ENVIRONMENTAL 
LAW 
Mark Sagojf"' 
Many economists take the view that environmental problems are 
economic problems. I They believe that market failure causes these 
problems: private and social costs diverge; profit-maxiroizioB deci-
sions, therefore, are socially inefficient.2 Economists would correct 
this market failure by requiring private decision makers to internal-
ize externalities, that is, to make the price of goods reflect all the 
economic and social costs of producing them, including the pollution 
costs. When this is done, they argue, pollution will be controlled, 
endangered species will be saved, and pristine areas will be pre-
served, but only to the extent that the benefits therefrom exceed the 
costs.3 Any increase in environmental protection from an "optimal" 
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I. See, e.g., Ruff, Tire Economic Common Sense of Pollution, in MICROECONOMICS: SE-
LECTED READINGS 498 (2d ed. E. Mansfield ed. 1975). Ruff states this thesis clearly: ''We are 
going to make little real progress in solving the problem of pollution until we recognize it for 
what, primarily, it is: an econoinic problem, which must be understood in econoinic terms." 
Id See generally w. BAUMOL & W. OATES, THE THEORY OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 
(1975); J. DALES, POLLUTION, PROPERTY, AND PRICES (1968); A. FREEMAN, R. HAVEMAN & A. 
KNEESE, THE ECONOMICS OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY (1973). For a good annotated bibliog-
raphy of the recent literature, see Fisher & Peterson, Tire Environment in Economics: A s_urvey, 
14 J. ECON. LIT. 1 (1976). 
2. Ruff, supra note I, at 501. I shall not discuss here the fainiliar objection that econoinic 
marginal analysis cannot usefully apply to systems as complex as those found in nature. This 
objection has two sides. First, a marginal increment in pollution does not necessarily result in 
a corresponding marginal injury to the environment. For instance, a river may be able to 
absorb a continuous low-level flow of pollutants, as well as small increases in that flow. But 
there may be a tipping point beyond which the river can absorb no more pollution. Econoinic 
analysis, therefore, must respond to ecological considerations. 
Second, we cannot always trace unwanted natural consequences to particular causes. Can-
cer, for example, has many causes, including smoking, stress, genetic disposition, pollution, 
and other conditions. To ask ''how much" cancer is caused by "environmental" factors and 
"how much" by "genetic" factors may be to ask a meaningless or confused question - like 
asking "how much" of the area of a football field is due to its width and "how much" results 
from its length. For a discussion of this problem, see Lewontin, Tire Analysis of Variance and 
the Analysis of Causes, in THE 1.Q. CONTROVERSY 179 (N. Block & G. Dworkin eds. 1976). 
3. William Baxter has advocated this approach: 
The first and most fundamental step toward solution of our environmental problems is a 
clear recognition that our objective is not pure air or water but rather some optimal state 
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level "would cost more than it is worth," while any decrease would 
"reduce benefits more than it would save in costs."4 
Although this economic approach purports to allow us to choose 
the best among available policies, in fact it makes economic effi-
ciency our only goal. Economic efficiency has traditionally been un-
derstood to require the maximum satisfaction of the preferences that 
markets reveal.5 These are typically self-regarding or self-interested 
preferences, that is, preferences that reflect a person's idea of his or 
her individual welfare. Preferences of this sort may be contrasted 
with preferences that express what the individual believes is in the 
public interest or in the interest of a group or community to which he 
or she belongs. 6 Political activity is supposed, in theory at least, to 
provide a vehicle for airing, criticizing, and settling upon interests or 
opinions of this group-regarding kind.7 
The search for economic efficiency might take us to the best pub-
lic policies if we were a nation of individualists competing each for 
his or her own welfare with no regard for or conception of the collec-
tive good. Then an efficient market might lead us to satisfy as well 
as possible all of our interests. In such a situation, government 
might best be conceived as a prophylactic on markets, and public 
policies might be considered irrational if they could not be construed 
as reasonable responses to market failures. 8 But we are not simply a 
group of consumers, nor are we bent on satisfying only self-regard-
ing preferences. Many of us advocate ideals and have a vision of 
what we should do or be like as a nation. And we would sacrifice 
some of our private interests for those public ends. 
of pollution. That step immediately suggests the question: How do we define and attain 
the level that will yield the maximum possible amount of satisfaction? 
W. BAXTER, PEOPLE OR PENGUINS: THE CASE FOR OPTJ!w\L POLLUTION 8-9 (1974). 
4. See Ruff, supra note l, at 500-01. 
5. See, e.g., Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics and Legal Theory, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 103 
(1979). Posner equates efficiency with wealth-maximization: 'The only kind of preference 
that counts in a system of wealth maximization is thus one that is backed up by money- in 
other words, that is registered in a market." Id. at 119. 
6. For an excellent presentation of this distinction, see Maass, Benefit-Cost Analysis: Its 
Relevance to Public Investment .Decisions, 80 Q.J. EcoN. 208, 213-19 (1966). See generally M. 
HOLLIS, MODELS OF MAN (1977); Benn, Rationality and Political Behaviour, in RATIONALITY 
AND THE SocIAL SCIENCES 246 (G. Mortimore & S. Benn eds. 1976); Benn, The Problematic 
Rationality of Political Participation, in PHILOSOPHY, PoLmcs, AND SOCIETY 291 (5th Ser. P. 
Laslett & J. Fishkin eds. 1979); Goodin, Cross-Cutting Cleavages and Social Conflict, 5 BRIT. J. 
POL. Sc1. 516 (1975). 
7. For a discussion of this theory and its analysis, see Banfield & Wilson, Public-Regarding-
ness as a Value Premise in Voting Behavior, 58 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 876 (1964); Goodin & 
Roberts, The Ethical Voter, 69 AM. POL. Sc1. REv. 926 (1975). 
8. This appears to be the position of economists and philosophers in the classical liberal 
tradition. See note 96 i'!fra. 
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There may be individuals who believe that our nation as a whole 
should dedicate itself entirely to the interests that individuals pursue 
as individuals.9 This belief comes into question, however, when we 
distinguish what people want for themselves and what they think is 
best for the community.10 Why should we believe that the right pol-
icy goal is the one that satisfies only the self-interested preferences of 
consumers? Why should we not take into account the community-
regarding values that individuals seek through the political process 
as well? 11 
In Part I of this essay, I argue that environmental legislation, at 
least during the past twenty years, fails to make economic "common 
sense,"12 that is, it fails to maximize the satisfaction of consumer de-
9. Libertarians take this position. Friedrich Hayek, for example, writes that the activities 
of government are "part of its effort to provide a favorable framework for individual decisions; 
they supply means which individuals can use for their own purposes." F. HAYEK, THE CON-
STITUTION OF LIBERTY 223 (1960). Individuals are free, of course, to engage in altruistic or 
other-regarding activities as individuals; for the libertarian, however, the state is not to be the 
vehicle for satisfying these public wants. Liberals in the classical tradition take this view. See 
M. FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 12 (1962) ("[A] major aim of the liberal is to leave 
the ethical problem to the individual to wrestle with."). Isaiah Berlin has observed: 
Most modem liberals, at their most consistent, want a situation in which as many individ-
uals as possible can realize as many of their ends as possible, without assessment of the 
value of these ends as such, save in so far as they may frustrate the purposes of others. 
They wish the frontiers between individuals or groups of men to be drawn solely with a 
view to preventing collisions between human purposes, all of which must be considered to 
be equally ultimate, uncriticizable ends in themselves. 
I. BERLIN, Two Concepts of Liberty, in FOUR EssA YS ON LIBERTY 153 n. l (1969). Barry has a 
good simile for this. ''The state, in the liberal view, must be capaole of fulfilling the same self-
effacing function as a policeman on point-duty, who facilitates the motorists' getting to their 
several destinations without bumping into one another but does not have any power to influ-
ence those destinations." B. BARRY, POLlTICAL ARGUMENT 74 (1965) (footnote omitted). 
Barry notes that this is not the same as laissez-faire. ''The only thing on which it insists is that 
the state should be conceived as satisfying wants arising independently of its influence." Id. at 
74 n.2. 
10. Economists sometimes blur this with the distinction between efficiency goals and 
equality goals in public policy. See, e.g., A. OKUN, EQUALITY AND EFFICIENCY: THE BIG 
TRADEOFF (1975). But it is plain that we pursue many goals in our role as citizens, e.g., the 
preservation of wilderness for its own sake, that have nothing to do with redistributive norms. 
1 I. One answer to this question may be fear that the majority, guided by some moral 
fanaticism, will exercise tyranny over the minority. See generally H. ARENDT, THE HUMAN 
CONDITION (1958); K. POPPER, THE OPEN SOCIETY AND ITS ENEMIES (1966); L. STRAUSS, 
NATURAL RIGHT AND HISTORY (1953); L. STRAUSS, ON TYRANNY (1968). The threat of tyr-
anny, however, does not justify the conclusion that the majority ought to have no power, 
through legislation, to make policy based on moral belief. It requires only that this power be 
constrained by a system of civil and political rights. For an important criticism of Popper and 
Arendt, see Holmes, Aristippus In and Out of Athens, 13 AM. PoL. Sci. REV. 113 (1979). John 
Rawls has written on the extent to which justice gives political rights to the majority to make 
law based upon the principles that it thinks best and the extent to which justice would limit this 
power by assigning civil rights to individuals and minorities. See J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF 
JUSTICE 195-257, 356-62 (1971); Rawls, Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory, 11 J. PHIL. 
515, 519 (1980). 
12. I derive this term from Ruff, supra note I. 
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mand over the long run. Laws like the Endangered Species Act13 
fl.out this conception of economic efficiency. This is how most Amer-
icans would have it: most Americans reject the notion that the natu-
ral environment should be made over to serve the wants of the self-
interested consumer. Part II describes the way that economists have 
attempted to take account of citizen or community-regarding prefer-
ences. I suggest that they do this primarily by giving these convic-
tions and beliefs shadow or surrogate prices as if they were market 
externalities. In Part II, I argue briefly that this shadow pricing of 
political, moral, and cultural convictions vitiates cost-benefit analy-
sis. Shadow pricing allows the analyst to justify virtually any policy 
by assigning the appropriate prices to the opinions of the political 
constituency that favors it. There is, then, no popular public policy 
that cannot then be justified on "economic" grounds. 
In Part III of this essay, I extend my criticism of cost-benefit 
analysis to show that it confuses statements of principle or opinion 
with wants and interests of the kind that are properly revealed in and 
satisfied by markets. I argue that it is a mistake to treat views or 
convictions that merit the dignity of a hearing as if they were only 
wants or interests deserving of a price. I conclude that attempts to 
base environmental law on economic theory must fail. 
I 
Anyone who believes that government ought to be primarily in-
terested in correcting market failure must find puzzling much of our 
environmental legislation. Environmentalist groups, not famous for 
their economic "common sense," successfully backed much of this 
legislation in the 1970s. It is not surprising, therefore, that environ-
mental protection goes beyond the mere correction of market defi-
ciencies. Congress designed the Clean Air14 and Clean Water Acts15 
to improve the quality of our air and water. It passed the Endan-
gered Species Act16 to protect threatened species, even if the eco-
13. Endangered Species Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (codified at 16 U.S.C. 
§§ 1531-1543 (1976)), as amended by Endangered Species Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. 
No. 95-632, 92 Stat. 3751 (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-43 (Supp. III 1979)). 
14. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676. The 1970 
amendments so drastically changed the 1967 Air Quality Act, Pub. L. No. 90-148, 84 Stat. 485, 
that they are usually called the 1970 Clean Air Act. The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, 
Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685, made further changes, and recodified the entire statute at 42 
U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (Supp. II 1978). 
15. Clean Water Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1566 (codified at 33 U.S.C. 
§§ 1251-1375 (Supp. II 1978)). 
16. See note 13 supra. 
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nomic costs of protection outweigh the benefits.17 Similarly, the 
Occupational Safety and Health Act18 seeks to make the workplace 
safe and healthful, a goal that is not always consistent with market 
efficiency. These laws attempt to correct perceived environmental, 
rather than economic, problems. Congress did not limit itself to pro-
viding economically optimal solutions. 19 
Consider, for example, the 1977 Clean Air Act Amendments, 
which designated all national parks and wilderness areas as Class I 
lands to protect them from significant deterioration of air quality.20 
This insistence upon preserving air quality in pristine areas does not 
rest upon an economic calculation. It is justified, rather, by a na-
tional sense of responsibility. What kind of nation would turn 
magnificient wilderness areas into polluted fens in order to make en-
ergy cheaper and therefore easier to waste? Questions like this have 
17. See TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 184 (1978). 
18. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1976 & Supp. III 1979). 
19. In this Part, I discuss the economic implications of existing legislation under traditional 
economic doctrine. A few examples indicate that this legislation seeks to do much more than 
merely to correct market failure and to implement cost-beneficial programs. Sections 
2ll(c)(2)(A) and (B) of the Clean Air Act authorize the Environmental Protection Agency to 
prohibit or regulate any additive that endangers public health after the agency has considered 
"other technologically or economically feasible means of achieving emission standards . . • ." 
This may be contrasted with the prohibition of additives that impair emission control devices, 
which is permitted only after consideration of cost-beneficiality. 42 U.S.C. § 7545(c)(2)(A)-(B) 
(Supp. III 1979). For a relevant historical view of air pollution control legislation, see J. DA-
VIES, THE POLITICS OF POLLUTION (1970); and THE RALPH NADER STUDY GROUP REPORT ON 
AIR POLLUTION, VANISHING AIR (1970). 
Similarly, § 6(b)(5) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5) 
(1976), which governs standards for toxic substances, stipulates: "The Secretary .•. shall set 
the standard which most adequately assures, to the extent feasible, . . . that no employee will ,,. 
suffer material impairment of health or functional capacity even if such employee has regular 
exposure to the ... [regulated toxic substance] for the period of his working life." Because 
"feasible" means something different than "efficient," Congress may not have intended that 
the agency set only standards that meet traditional cost-benefit tests. This matter has been 
litigated in important recent cases, including Industrial Union Dept. v. American Petroleum 
Inst., 448 U.S. 607 (1980) (plurality opinion), qffg. sub nom., American Petroleum Inst. v. 
OSHA, 581 F.2d 493 (5th Cir. 1978); and American Textile Mfgrs. Inst. v. Bingham, 617 F.2d 
636 (D.C. Cir. 1979), qffd sub nom., American Textile Mfgrs. Inst., Inc. v. Donovan, 101 S. Ct. 
2478 (1981). 
The judiciary has generally been receptive to legislation that is not justifiable in simple· 
economic cost-benefit terms. For example, the Sixth Circuit, in Hill v. TVA, 549 F.2d 1064 
(6th Cir. 1977), qffd, 437 U.S. 153 (1978) (which concerned the Tellico Dam and the snail 
darter), specifically rejected an interest-balancing approach in applications of the Endangered 
Species Act. The court concluded that "the welfare of an endangered species may weigh more 
heavily upon the public conscience, as expressed by the final will of Congress, than the writeoff 
of those millions of dollars already expended for Tellico .... " 549 F.2d at 1074. The court 
added: "Economic exigencies . . . do not grant courts a license to rewrite a statute no matter 
how desirable the purpose or result might be." 549 F.2d at 1074 (quoting West Virginia Div. of 
Izaak Walton League, Inc. v. Butz, 522 F.2d 945, 955 (4th Cir. 1975)). The Supreme Court 
affirmed that Congress may enact environmental legislation for purposes other than to make 
markets efficient. TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 187-88 (1978). 
20. 42 U.S.C. § 7472 (Supp. II 1978). 
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led many Americans to believe that the preservation of wilderness 
from pollution is what national dignity and self-respect minimally 
require. This belief has little to do with economic "common sense." 
Those of us who approve of the amended Clean Air Act are not 
necessarily likely to use the wilderness areas that these laws protect. 
We are more likely to consume the energy that would be produced 
by polluting these lands. Cost-benefit analysis, insofar as it reflects 
what consumers buy rather than what citizens respect, would lead to 
a policy directly opposed to the Act. 
The Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 197221 
are similarly unresponsive to economic "common sense." These 
amendments required all industries to install the "best practicable 
[pollution] control technology currently available" by 1977.22 By 
1983, industries must install "the best available technology economi-
cally achievable."23 The best technology that is economically achiev-
able is likely to be considerably more expensive than the technology 
that is economically efficient. The law, therefore, will force industry 
to spend much more to prevent pollution than it would cost society 
as a whole to endure it. The amendments may require industry to 
invest millions in pollution control equipment merely to provide a 
few thousand dollars' worth of clean water. These requirements can-
not be squared, in any ordinary way, with a market approach to 
sound regulatory policy.24 They call for standards that are not eco-
nomically efficient, standards that cannot be justified in terms of sat-
isfaction of aggregate consumer demand. 
One reason for these laws is that Americans have moral convic-
tions about the environment that have nothing to do with economic 
"common sense." A majority of Americans strongly prefer environ-
mental laws that are not economically efficient.25 The Endangered 
Species Act remains popular, even though people must recognize 
21. Pub. L. No. 92-500 §§ 1-13, 86 Stat. 816 (1972). 
22. 33 U.S.C. § 131l(b)(l)(A) (1976). 
23. 33 U.S.C. § 131l(b)(2)(A) (1976). 
24. See McKinnon, The Federal Water Pollution Control Act - Industrial Challenges lo 
E.ftluent Limitations, 1 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 545 (1979). 
25. If survey answers are any indication, most Americans believe that we ought not to 
trade environmental goals for economic ones. About half of the respondents in a 1980 Na-
tional Opinion Research Center survey said that we are spending "too little" on environmental 
problems; only 15% said ''too much." National Opinion Research Center, University of Chi-
cago, 1980 survey, reported in U.S. COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, PUBLIC OPINION 
ON NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES 2-3 (1980) [hereinafter cited as PUBLIC OPINION ON 
ENVIRONMENTAL lssuES]. A plurality of respondents to a major Resources for the Future poll 
thought that environmental protection is too important to consider costs. Given three choices, 
42% of those who answered felt that: "Protecting the environment is so important that require-
ments and standards cannot be too high, and continuing improvement must be made regard-
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that the benefits of preserving Lange's metalmark,26 the snail darter, 
or the furbish lousewort may not equal the costs.27 We choose to 
save the metalmark to prove to ourselves that we are not motivated 
solely by economic self-interest. Rather, we act upon moral values 
and a sense of national responsibility to the land that we inhabit. 
Our environmental laws illustrate that we are governed by legis-
latures, not by markets. There are currently before the courts a vari-
ety of cases in which industry has requested relief from economically 
burdensome regulations promulgated by administrative agencies. 28 
Industry argues that regulations imposing costs far in excess of their 
benefits are unreasonable, and that courts interpreting these regula-
tions should consider economic factors. 29 That benefits exceed costs, 
however, is not a constitutional requirement for congressional regu-
lation of commerce. A legislative majority voted for the Clean 
less of cost." Id. at 3 (emphasis original). The results from this poll also appear in 
RESOURCES, Sept.-Nov. 1978, at 1. 
These responses are typical. One question, used three times by the National Opinion Re-
search Center between 1975 and 1978, asked: "Do you think that now it is more important to 
pay higher prices to protect the environment, or to pay lower prices but have more air and 
water pollution?" PUBLIC OPINION ON ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES, supra, at 9, 11 (emphasis 
original). The percentage of people who were willing to pay higher prices for environmental 
protection was consistently about three times the percentage who "wanted to pay lower prices 
but have more air and water pollution." Id. at 11. 
Harris polls have reached similar results. See id. at 4. One poll, conducted in October 
1979, asked, ''Would you enforce the toughest environmental standards possible, even if they 
increased the cost of things to both business and the consumer, or would you be satisfied with a 
somewhat lower level of environmental standards if this turned out to be less costly?" In reply, 
45% chose the "toughest environmental standards possible," 36% chose "somewhat lower stan-
dards," and 12% replied "it depends." Id. at 11. 
26. A few acres near Los Angeles, known as the Antioch dunes, are the habitat of several 
species of butterflies, including the endangered and beautiful Lange's metalmark, whose range 
has otherwise been replaced by golf courses, outdoor cinemas, and highways. U.S. Fish and 
Wildlife Service, Antioch .Dunes Acquired far Butte,:fly and Two Plant Species, 5 ENDANGERED 
SPECIES TECH. BULL. 1, 6 (1980). The dunes are also a place where people can go on a Satur-
day afternoon to tear around on their dune buggies or dirt bikes. The economic "common 
sense" way to handle this situation would be to ask whether bikers will pay more to use the 
dunes than butterfly fanciers will pay to preserve them. The Endangered Species Act, how-
ever, prevented the Fish and Wildlife Service from asking any such question. TVA v. Hill, 437 
U.S. 153, 187-88 (1978). The Service simply acquired the dunes to protect the metalmark. 
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, supra, at 6. 
27. Respondents to one public opinion poll approved the Endangered Species Act by a 7-2 
margin. See PUBLIC OPINION ON ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES, supra note 25, at 18. 
28. In the most famous of these cases, Industrial Union Dept. v. American Petroleum Inst., 
448 U.S. 607 (1980) (plurality opinion), the Supreme Court narrowly set aside a benzene stan-
dard promulgated by OSHA. Other cases in which industry requested relief from regulation 
on cost-benefit grounds include American Iron & Steel Inst. v. OSHA, 577 F.2d 825 (3d Cir. 
1978); Aqua Slide 'N' Dive Corp. v. CPSC, 569 F.2d 831 (5th Cir. 1978); Reserve Mining Co. 
v. EPA, 514 F.2d 492 (8th Cir. 1975); Society of Plastics Indus., Inc. v. OSHA, 509 F.2d 1301 
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 922 (1975); Industrial Union Dept. v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467 
(D.C. Cir. 1974). 
29. The argument by industry lawyers that courts should consider economic costs when 
interpreting environmental legislation seems innocent enough, but it may represent a "foot in 
the door" strategy. The lawyer who argues that a cost-benefit analysis should i'!fluence judicial 
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Water and Clean Air Acts, the Endangered Species Act, and other 
environmental legislation. Courts should enforce regulations that 
conform to the statutes, even if consumers as a result have to pay 
more than they receive in benefits.30 
To say that legislatures, not markets, govern and ought to govern 
us is, perhaps, to state the obvious. It may seem, however, to miss 
the economists' point. Some economists may believe that the legisla-
ture should act only as a prophylactic on consumer markets, for ex-
ample, by taxing or creating markets in externalities.31 Yet it is also 
possible for economists to argue that the political process is needed 
to elicit values that individuals cannot reveal in market transac-
tions. 32 Such an economist may suggest that policy analysis could 
justify - and Congress should enact - environmental laws that 
maximize benefits for individuals in their role as consumers and in 
their role as citizens. Economists might then assist the legislature by 
assigning prices to the convictions, ideals, opinions, or arguments 
that citizens present in political forums and other nonmarket con-
texts. We cannot assume that cost-benefit analysis is irrelevant to 
community-regarding preferences. We may, indeed, have to use ec-
onomic techniques in order to take into account opinions of this 
sort.33 
decisions, on winning that point in one case, may argue that it should be dispositive in the 
next. 
The question is whether economic methods, such as cost-benefit analysis, should help to 
decide, for example, what is "feasible" under§ 6(b)(5) of the Occupational Safety and Health 
Act or what is "reasonable" under the Federal Environmental Pesticide Control Act. See gen-
erally Berger & Riskin, Economic and Technological Feasibility in Regulating Toxic Substances 
unde,: the Occupational Sqfety and Health Act, 1 ECOLOGY L.Q. 285 (1978); Spector, Regulation 
of Pesticides by the Environmental Protection Agency, 5 ECOLOGY L.Q. 233 (1976). An eco-
nomically inefficient law is not necessarily an irrational one. See Bice, Rationality Analysis in 
Constitutional Law, 65 MINN. L. REV. 1 (1980); Delgado,ActiveRationalityinJudiclal Review, 
64 MINN. L. REV. 467 (1980). 
30. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 450-55 (1978). Four Supreme Court 
Justices accepted such an argument in defense of OSHA's benzene standard in Industrial 
Union Dept. v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607 (1980) (plurality opinion). Justice 
Marshall, with whom three Justices joined, wrote in dissent: 
If the statutory language and legislative intent are plain, the judicial inquiry is at an end. 
Under our jurisprudence, it is presumed the ill-considered or unwise legislation will be 
corrected through the democratic process; a court is not permitted to distort a statutc?s 
meaning in order to make it conform with the Justice's own views of sound policy. 
448 U.S. at 688 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
31. This is the standard approach. See note 1 supra. 
32. See, e.g., A. DASGUPTA & D. PEARCE, COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 139 (1972). 
33. Arthur Maass writes: "Some day, I am confident, we shall be able to use institutions 
that elicit community oriented responses to measure all factors in a complex objective function 
-efficiency, income distribution, and others." Maass, supra note 6, at 217. Maass then envi-
sions the possibility that policy analysts someday will be able to balance our willingness to pay 
for efficiency against our willingness to pay for equality and other (includini environmental) 
nonefficiency goals. This is the strongest presentation of the view against which I argue in the 
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Although economic approaches to public policy may purport to 
weigh both consumer and citizen values, 34 we may, as citizens, be-
lieve that certain public values or collective goals (e.g., that an inno-
cent person not be convicted) supersede the values that we pursue as 
self-seeking individuals (e.g., security from crime).35 Moreover, we 
might decide to sacrifice economic optimality for cleaner air and 
water. Once legislatures, responding to political pressure, have made 
this choice, is it defensible for economists to insist that our poli-
cymaking process include the very consumer values that we have de-
cided to sacrifice?36 Shall economic analysts, rather than 
legislatures, determine the balance to be struck between our prefer-
ences as consumers and our opinions as citizens?37 To ask the ques-
third part of this Article. For a su=ary of the literature supporting this approach, see J. 
ROTHENBERG, THE MEASUREMENT OF SOCIAL WELFARE 296-97 (1961). 
34. Robert Goodin provides the following illustration of the difficulty of balancing "pub-
lic" and "private" wants. 
One of the most compelling reasons for the individual to discount future costs and bene-
fits relative to present ones is that, come the time, he may not be alive to experience them. 
How heavily he should discount depends upon how far they are in the future and, of 
course, on his own life expectancy. . . . From a purely individual point of view, he 
would be foolish not to discount future payoffs in this way. But risk-of-death discount 
rates have no relevance whatsoever for social decision-making .••. Although individu-
als are mortal, society is not. 
Goodin, Laundering Preferences, in FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL CHOICE THEORY (J. Elster ed.) 
(publication forthcoming). This example suggests either that social planners must disregard 
individuals' time preferences (and thus reject consumer sovereignty), or that the individuals 
themselves must put aside personal preferences and adopt a group perspective. There seems to 
be no way to combine or balance the two separate discount rates. 
35. But this has a darker side. The group-regarding preferences of a "moral" majority may 
be held to outweigh the self-regarding preferences of individuals, for example, in the matter of 
the regulation of pornography. When are group-regarding preferences tied to a legitimate 
ideal and when are they merely meddlesome in the affairs of others? When can a group ideal 
legitimately override individual preference? When, in other words, may society legitimately 
prevent transactions that parties assent to and that violate no one's rights? For a classic state-
ment of this problem, see Sen, The Impossibility of a Paretian Liberal, 78 J. PoL. EcoN. 152 
(1970). For a review of the responding literature, see Sen, Liberty, Unanimity and Rights, 43 
EcONOMICA (n.s.) 217 (1976). For an excellent rebuttal of Sen that describes the grounds for 
the legitimate assertion of group-regarding or moral over individual-regarding or consumer 
preferences, see Barry, Lady Chatterly's Lover and .Doctor Fischer's Bomb Party: Liberalism, 
Pareto Optimality and the Problem of Objectionable Preferences, in FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL 
CHOICE THEORY (J. Elster ed.) (publication forthcoming). 
36. President Reagan has, at least in part, adopted this economic "co=on sense" ap-
proach to regulation. See note 111 i'!fra. 
37. The question is whether we should base environmental policy, at least in part, on ideals 
that people hold and are willing to defend rather than solely on the preferences that they 
reveal in markets. These ideals may represent universal principles - principles that individu-
als attribute to themselves as Americans or as members of some other moral co=unity. This 
is logically independent of what they prefer as consumers. Well-known statements of environ-
mental ideals or ideology include s. BRUBAKER, To LIVE ON EARTH: MAN AND HIS ENVI-
RONMENT IN PERSPECTIVE (1972); L. CALDWELL, ENVIRONMENT: A CHALLENGE FOR 
MODERN SOCIETY (1970); ]. MCPHEE, ENCOUNTERS WITH THE ARCHDRUID (1971); W. 
OPHULS, ECOLOGY AND THE POLITICS OF SCARCITY (1977); THE ECOLOGICAL CONSCIENCE: 
VALUES FOR SURVIVAL (R. Disch ed. 1970); Ashby, Towards an Environmental Ethic, 262 NA-
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tion in this fashion is to answer it. Before we draw any final 
conclusions, we should examine more closely the decision-making 
apparatus that the economists advocate. Part II attempts such an 
examination. 
II 
Economists understand, of course, that environmental legislation 
may be founded on different values than consumers reveal in the 
marketplace. They recognize the importance of "public" as well as 
"private" wants.38 Related distinctions are sometimes drawn be-
tween "ideal-regarding" and "want-regarding" preferences,39 and 
between "external" and "personal" preferences.40 In The Theory of 
Public Finance, Richard Musgrave observed that individuals are so-
cial creatures who depend "in their preferences and actions on their 
social environments, and their relations to others."41 People rarely 
make choices merely for themselves, as though they were in a Robin-
son Crusoe setting; rather, "all sorts of social motivations enter, be it 
with regard to private or to public wants."42 Musgrave concluded: 
A person may favor expenditures for courts or for education, not only 
because they will improve his safety, increase his learning, give the 
pleasure of dealing with more educated neighbors, or because he ex-
pects them to think well of him if he appears socially minded; he may 
favor them simply because he feels that he should contribute to the 
good life of others.43 
What Musgrave misses is this: it is not the individual but the 
situation - or the way that a question is put - that determines 
whether public or private wants enter materially into his or her re-
TURE 84 (1976); Boulding, Commons and Community: The Idea of a Public, in MANAGING THE 
COMMONS (G. Hardin & J. Baden eds. 197.7). 
38. See, e.g., Arrow, Public and Private Values, in HUMAN VALUES AND ECONOMIC POL-
ICY 3 (S. Hook ed. 1967); Marglin, The Social Rate of .Discount and the Optimal Rate of Invest-
ment, 11 Q.J. ECON. 94, 98 (1963). 
39. B. BARRY, supra note 9, at 71-72, 81-83, 94-95, 287, 297-98. 
40. R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 234,275 (1977). Dworkin's notion of"exter-
nal" preference seems to include "public" wants or what I have called citizen or community-
regarding preferences. Thus, in excluding external preferences from those that the poli-
cymaker should take into account, Dworkin seems to limit the role of government to that of 
policing consumer markets, to make them fair and, as a possible result, efficient. For discus-
sion of Dworkin's view of external preference, see Raz, Professor .Dworkin's Theory of Rights, 
26 PoL. STUD. 123, 131-32 (1978). Raz makes the point that the content ofan external prefer-
ence, rather than the mere fact that it is external or other-regarding, makes it worthy or unwor-
thy of public consideration. Thus the question whether group-regarding preferences should or 
should not override self-regarding preferences, see note 6 supra, seems to depend on their 
substance rather than their form. 
41. R. MUSGRAVE, THE THEORY OF PUBLIC FINANCE 11 (1959). 
42. Id. 
43. Id. at 11-12. 
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sponse. Does the individual act in a political context, for example, 
by answering a survey or casting a vote? If so, he or she is likely to 
express or reveal citizen preferences. If it is a market situation in-
stead, then he or she will probably choose as a consumer. The role 
that the individual plays depends upon the way that the stage is set.44 
The question, then, is how can a neutral balance be struck between 
values revealed in market and in nonmarket transactions? 
Since people usually find themselves making consumer choices, 
the preferences that they are likely to express will be self-regarding 
rather than group-regarding. An individual may buy a vacation 
home even if he or she disapproves of the vacation home industry 
because it destroys wilderness.45 What we do as consumers - the 
choices that we make and may feel constrained to make within mar-
kets - may dismay us as citizens. How can we avoid these citizen 
"costs" unless we vote against our consumer interests? That we may 
reject consumer sovereignty in our role as citizens does not mean 
that all economic approaches to public policy are futile. It only im-
plies that economists must develop a convincing way to take into 
account citizen "costs" or "externalities" (if that is what they are). 
Economists typically accomplish this by assigning prices to pub-
lic wants or ci~izen preferences.46 These are swept together with 
"merit wants,"47 and "ideal-regarding" preferences (which include 
ethical principles)48 to form what economists generally refer to as 
"fragile," "soft," or "intangible" variables.49 Once they are priced, 
44. "An individual's response depends, then, on the institutional environment in which the 
question is asked." Maass, supra note 6, at 216. 
45. See, e.g., Heller, The Importance ef Normative Decision-Making: The Limitations ef 
Legal Economics as a Basis far a Liberal Jurisprudence -As Illustrated by the Regulation ef 
Vacation Homes Development, 1976 WIS. L. REv. 385, 399. 
46. An easier way to do this - by insisting that an individual who has conflicting private 
and public preferences is irrational - merely begs the question. It does not seem irrational for 
a person to vote and speak his conscience but shop his self-interest. See J. MEADE, THE THE-
ORY OF ECONOMIC EXTERNALITIES 51-52 (1973) ("In my view the ideal society would be one 
in which each citizen developed a real split personality, acting selfishly in the market place and 
altruistically at the ballot box."). 
47. For a discussion of merit wants in relation to conflicts between economic and political 
institutions of choice, see A. WILDA VSKY, SPEAKING TRUTH TO POWER: THE ART AND CRAFT 
OF POLICY MAKING 155-83 (1979). Wildavsky argues from premises similar to mine to the 
conclusion that ''better a flawed economics than a bogus politics." Id. at 156. 
48. See B. BARRY, supra note 9. 
49. By pricing these ethical concerns, cost-benefit analysis can favor the result reached in 
the political arena. "Soft" or "intangible" externalities function as fudge factors that are help-
ful m making cost-benefit analysis do political work. "So called intangibles like recreation 
values were credited with increasingly large shares of the benefits, thus representing a 'finagle' 
factor that could be enlarged almost at will to provide justification." Wildavsky, Aesthetic 
Power or the Triumph ef the Sensitive Minority Over the Vulgar Mass: A Political Analysis ef the 
New Economics, 96 DAEDALUS 1115, 1116 (1967). See B. ACKERMAN, s. ROSE-ACKERMAN, J. 
SAWYER, JR. & D. HENDERSON, THE UNCERTAIN SEARCH FOR ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 
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these values are integrated with ordinary self-interested consumer 
wants on a single social preference-schedule. so 
Thus, economists may ask what you are willing to pay for the 
knowledge that your nation preserves beautiful environments and 
rare species.51 What is it worth to you to have a clear conscience 
141-42 (1974). The authors point out that "although a citizen may never himself engage in 
outdoor activities, he may well be willing to sacrifice a substantial amount of money simply to 
give himself the satisfaction of knowing that nature is preserved." Id. at 141. They caution, 
however, that "a rigorous assessment of the amount of money that 'naturalists' are willing to 
sacrifice to avoid personal pain at the thought of nature ravaged could easily elude the econo-
mist researcher." Id. 
Of course, cost-benefit analysts could (but do not) price the views of the anti-environmental 
lobby. For a sense of these "intangibles" or anti-environmentalist "moralisms," see B. 
FRIEDEN, THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION HUSTLE (1979). For a discussion of the way 
that economists may compare "intangibles" by the measuring rod of money, see E. MISHAN, 
COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 406-08 (1976). 
50. See N. COOMBER & A. BISWAS, EVALUATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL INTANGIBLES 
(1973); ELECTRIC POWER INSTITUTE, PROCEEDINGS OF A WORKSHOP ON THE MEASURE OF 
INTANGIBLE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS (1977); A. FREEMAN, THE BENEFITS OF ENVIRON• 
MENTAL IMPROVEMENT 85-107 (1979); D. SAVAGE, M. BURKE, J. COUPE, T. DUSCHESNEAU, 
D. WIHRY & J. WILSON, THE ECONOMICS OF ENVIRONMENTAL IMPROVEMENT 119-41 (1974); 
Brookshire, Ives & Schulze, The Valuation of Aesthetic Preferences, 3 J. ENVTL. EcoN. & MAN• 
AGEMENT 325 (1976); McKean, The Use of Shadow Prices, in PROBLEMS IN PUBLIC EXPEND)• 
TURE ANALYSIS (S. Chase ed. 1968); Smith, The Treatment of Intangibles in Cost-Benefit 
Analysis, 4 ENVTL. CONTROL NEWSLETTER no. 5 (May 7, 1976). 
Advocates of economic "co=on sense" could ignore these external or group-regarding 
preferences altogether. This approach is typified by Dworkin, Liberalism, in PUBLIC AND PRI• 
VATE MORALITY 113, 134 (S. Hampshire ed. 1978). This is a consequence of his liberal pro-
gram of advocating that government make decisions in a value-neutral way, by ridding its 
processes of any conception of the good life or of the values that enter that life. Id. at 134. 
This doctrine leaves environmental quality at the mercy of what Dworkin describes as a "self-
fueling and irreversible" consumer economy. Id. at 141-42. Dworkin is uncomfortable with 
this result, and tries to avert it by arguing that we may protect parts of the environment to 
preserve the moral opportunities of future generations. Id. This result seems to sacrifice the 
neutrality that Dworkin claims to value, but since I have co=ented elsewhere on this prob-
lem, see Sagoff, Efficiency, Equality, and the Environment (unpublished manuscript) (on file 
with the Michigan Law Review), I shall not do so here. 
Gerhard Colm offers a second suggestion. He argues that economists should accept the 
fact that a consumer, in market transactions, acts upon a different preference-schedule than the 
one that motivates him in political action and expression. G. COLM, The Theory of Public 
Expenditures, in ESSAYS IN PUBLIC FINANCE AND FISCAL POLICY 32-33 (1955). See R. Mus-
GRAVE, supra note 41, at 87-89. For an economist to concede this fact, however, is problem• 
atic, because terms like "efficiency'' and "Pareto optimality" lose their meanings. See Marglin, 
supra note 38. Economic "co=on sense" requires that we solve problems so as to maximize 
the satisfaction of preferences over the long run. But if an individual has not one but two or 
more preference-maps that lead him to respond differently in market and nonmarket situa-
tions, we would not know what economic "co=on sense" reco=ends. Colm seems happy 
with this result, since he adopts a "co=on will," rather than an "aggregate interest," analysis 
of the public good. See Colm, The Public Interest: Essential Key to Public Policy, in NoMos V: 
THE PUBLIC INTEREST 11 (C. Friedrich ed. 1962). It cannot be tolerated, however, by anyone 
who would preserve the conceptual foundations of normative economics. (Since I do not place 
myself in that group, I make this last point merely for academic reasons.) 
51. The effort to "shadow'' price "soft" externalities may best be understood as an attempt 
to save free-market economic theory from the objection that it leads to polluted rivers, con• 
gested highways, stinking air, and co=ercial blight. Economists have problems meeting this 
challenge because, even if all of the ''tangible" externalities are internalized, market forces 
may still produce environmental exploitation that is morally and aesthetically perverse. Econ-
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about these matters, insofar as you think of yourself as a responsible 
member of the national community? They may determine, by aggre-
gating the individual amounts, that even the metalmark and the 
lousewort have considerable shadow prices. 52 In this way, econo-
mists argue that they have found a value-neutral mechanism that 
takes into account all of our values, and indicates the optimal deci-
sion.53 
Economists have used this method54 to justify seemingly ineffi-
omists must demonstrate to their critics that this result is as distasteful to them economically as 
it is to us aesthetically: they must find a market failure. The tangible effects of commercial 
blight - for example, effects on health - may not be bad enough to demonstrate market 
failure; the "intangible" spillovers, however, may be sufficient. 
By accounting for these "intangible" spillovers, economists can show that "perfect" compe-
tition produces environments of which right-thinking environmentalists would approve. In 
this vein, Wildavsky concluded: · 
If present modes of economic justification are used, there is no way of preserving the basic 
values ... [economists as citizens] hold as users of the natural environment. To have 
personal values done in by professional values is no fun at all. Hence, a "new economics" 
has emerged to get around the old. If the old economics will not let you have what you 
know is right, it follows that a new economics is evidently needed. The term new econom-
ics of natural resources is used to designate an emerging trend and permits economists to 
avoid direct confrontation with political problems by bringing in aesthetic factors to make 
economic analysis come out "right." 
Wildavsky, supra note 49, at 1117-18 (emphasis original). 
52. See, e.g., G. CALABRESI & P. BOBBITT, TRAGIC CHOICES 32-33, 86 (1978); Calabresi & 
Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 
HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1111-12 (1972). 
53. At this point we may ask how economists know when markets fail. They may easily 
identify market failure where there are physical spillover effects, such as pollution. Econo-
mists, however, do not always think in terms of causal chains; instead, they speculate about 
anything that an individual might pay to avoid. Thus the paradigm of market failure has 
changed from the physical spillover to the transaction cost. See Coase, The Problem of Social 
Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. 1 (1960). While theorists before Coase spoke of a "trade-off' between 
efficiency and equality or justice, see, e.g., R. MusGRA VE, supra note 41, it is more fashionable, 
after Coase, to think of injustice as a cost primarily to uninvolved third parties who suffer from 
mere knowledge that some wrong has been done. I have taken this idea from Duncan Ken-
nedy, who pointed out that the conceptual shift from spillovers to transaction costs led theo-
rists such as Heller and Calabresi to regard moral judgments as market externalities. See 
Kennedy, Two Phases of the Fetishism of Commodities (unpublished manuscript) (on file with 
the Michigan Law Review). 
54. It becomes all too easy to show that a decision is "optimal." The problem is that any 
outcome - market or nonmarket - might be shown to be "efficient" by an able economist 
schooled in the ideas of free riders, fragile values, and transaction costs. See, e.g., Markovits, 
The .Distributive Impact, Allocative Efficiency, and Overall .Desirability of Ideal Housing Codes: 
Some Theoretical Clarifications, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1815, 1833 (1976); Michelman, Property, 
Utility and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 
HARV. L. REV. 1165 (1967). 
The economist has an important and arguable thesis to defend - that fair and efficient 
markets reveal and balance our preferences in the best possible way. Markets, under certain 
constraints and conditions, then, are democratic institutions. It is all too easy to tum this thesis 
from an arguable empirical proposition, having limits and needing qualification, into an un-
testable metaphysical truism. As far as I can tell, any law may be justified as a rational re-
sponse to a market failure. If a constituency exists for a law, many people support it. The rest 
is easy. An economist needs only to identify a "moral" extemality, talk about "free rider'' 
problems, and then say that the benefits of the legislation exceed the costs. The sort of "non-
sense on stilts" that leads some people to see every ethical act and every emotion as an exter-
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cient environmental legislation.55 In 1975, the Environmental Pro-
tection Agency, implementing the Clean Air Act,56 directed the 
states to "prevent significant deterioration" in areas where air quali-
ty exceeds national secondary standards.57 The regulation, in other 
words, seeks to keep clean air clean. The "prevention of significant 
deterioration" (PSD) doctrine may appeal to us on aesthetic or on 
ethical grounds,58 but its goal potentially conflicts with plans to lo-
cate a network of power plants in the Southwest, where both clean 
air and coal are abundant. Because PSD ignores many economic 
facts, the EPA's regulations appear to be inconsistent with economic 
"common sense." In a recent article, "An Experiment on the Eco-
nomic Value of Visibility," three University of Wyoming economists 
attempt to explain and justify the PSD requirements in economic 
terms.59 "Aesthetics," the authors said, "will play a major role. The 
PSD regulations amount to formal governmental admission that aes-
thetics, at least as embodied in atmospheric visibility, is a 'good' that 
nality has led Self to remark, wisely, that "[e]conomic measurement can only plausibly be 
extended to externalities at all in cases where the existence of a market can be predicated as 
possible and desirable in principle, and where its conditions can be specified." P. SELF, 
EcoNOCRATS AND THE POLICY PROCESS: THE POLITICS AND PHILOSOPHY OF COST-BENEFIT 
ANALYSIS 47 (1975). See generally Kelman, Cost-Benefit Analysis: An Ethical Critique, REGU· 
LATION, Jan.-Feb. 1981, at 33. 
55. See note 51 supra. The cost-benefit approach to public policy differs from the market 
approach. The market approach regulates only to price gross spillover effects where these 
physically affect health and property; thus even a regulated market may be insensitive to what 
people think and feel about decisions, when they are not otherwise affected by them. See A. 
HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY (1970). Markets, in other words, allow people to 
"enter" and "exit," but deny them a "voice." To correct for the fact that markets are not and 
cannot be political institutions, economists do cost-benefit analyses to bring their recommen-
dations more in line with politically acceptable decisions. They would then impose this deci-
sion on markets to make them reach the "right" outcome. Thus, while economic theorists 
begin by saying that the outcome of a free and fair market is the "correct" outcome, they end 
by determining independently the "right" outcome, and arguing that regulation is appropriate 
to correct market "failures" that prevent the realization of that result. 
56. See note 14 supra. 
57. The air quality standards and reference methods were first published on April 30, 1971, 
42 C.F.R. § 410 (1971) (recodified at 40 C.F.R. § 50 (1980)). 
58. For the importance of aesthetic goals in Clean Air Act implementation, see Sierra Club 
v. Ruckelshaus, 344 F. Supp. 253 (D.D.C. 1972), a.ffd sub nom. by an equally divided court per 
curiam, Fri v. Sierra Club, 412 U.S. 541 (1973). This decision prompted the PSD regulations. 
59. Rowe, d'Arge & Brookshire, An Experiment on the Economic Value of Visibility, 1 J. 
ENVTL. EcoN. & MANAGEMENT 1 (1980). For other studies using a similar approach, see, e.g., 
J. HAMMACK & G. BROWN, WATERFOWL AND WETLANDS: TOWARD BIOECONOMIC ANALYSIS 
(1974); Bowen, The interpretation of voting in the a/location of economic resources, 58 Q.J. 
ECON. 27 (1943), reprinted in READINGS IN WELFARE ECONOMICS 115 (J. Arrow & T. Scitov-
sky eds. 1969); Brookshire, Ives & Schultze, supra note 50; Kurz, Experimental Approach to t/1e 
J)etermination of the J)emandfor Public Goods, 3 J. PuB. EcoN. 329 (1974); Portnoy, Voting, 
Cost-Benefit Analysis and Water Pollution Policy, in COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS AND WATER 
POLLUTION POLICY 293 (H. Peskin & G. Seskin eds. 1975); Randall, Ives & Eastman, Bidding 
Games for Evaluation of Aesthetic Environmental Improvement, l J. ENVTL. EcoN. & MANAGE· 
MENT 132 (1974). 
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might have a positive value."60 
In order to put a price on aesthetic preferences for visibility, the 
authors showed a number of individuals photographs of scenes of 
the Southwest.61 In some of the pictures, the visibility was better 
than in others. They then asked the participants how much they 
would pay to preserve the visibility portrayed in the clearer photo-
graphs. The answers allowed the economists to establish a surrogate 
market in which they could price aesthetic benefits. 62 
Other researchers could modify the Wyoming economists' strat-
egy to determine the economic value of other aesthetic and moral 
benefits that currently have no fair market price. 63 In an instructive 
article on the burgeoning second-home and leisure-community in-
dustry, for example, Thomas Heller notes that commercial develop-
ment of wilderness and shoreland areas produces many economic 
benefits. "It is to be expected," he observes, "that landowners, labor-
ers, development firms, suppliers of capital, and businesses which 
service leisure communities would benefit from development."64 Yet 
many Americans oppose the transformation of our most beautiful 
and expressive landscapes into trailer parks and Shangri-las. They 
base their opposition, which is sometimes fierce, not on an interest in 
using the areas in question but on a belief that certain areas should 
be preserved for their own sake. As Heller notes: 
An important element of the demand for preservation, nowhere mani-
fested in market prices, may derive less from its instrumental utility 
than from its symbolic meaning. For some, a serious loss of well-being 
at stake in the development of second homes results from a broadly 
held commitment to the normative position that nature is a source of 
value not because it is used but because it continues to exist. 65 
Supporters of this "normative" position argue that we ought to value 
60. Rowe, d'Arge & Brookshire, supra note 59, at 1. 
61. Rowe, d'Arge & Brookshire reject the idea that economists cannot measure intangibles 
such as aesthetic values: 
Economists generally have shied away from attempting to quantify aesthetic phenom-
ena because they are usually defined as intangible. However, the perspective that aes-
thetic phenomena are unquantifiable employing economic analysis may be unduly 
pessimistic. Beauty, or aesthetic phenomena, given that some physical measure is avail-
able which is perceivable with human senses, should be measurable in economic terms. 
Further, PSD regulations indirectly necessitate quantification. 
Id at 2. 
62. Id at 5. 
63. See, e.g., Cicchetti, Freeman, Haveman & Knetsch, On the Economics of Mass .Demon-
strations: A Case Study of the November 1969 March on Washington, 61 AM. EcoN. REV. 719 
(1971). Since I have criticized this and similar cost-benefit analyses elsewhere, see Sagoff, The 
Ethical Basis of Cost-Benefit Analysis (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Michigan 
Law Review), I shall not repeat myself here. 
64. Heller, supra note 45, at 399. 
65. Id at 405 (footnote omitted). 
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magnificent environments as ends in themselves, rather than trade 
them "at the margin" as economic theory might insist. 
Economists must reconcile this "normative" position with the ec-
onomic approach. The validity of this approach rests on the idea 
that it allows policymakers to consider all the costs and benefits of a 
proposed course of action. It may be difficult to price such senti-
ments as Heller described; yet it need not lie beyond the sophisti-
cated techniques of cost-benefit analysis. The problem is that no 
market exists to price the "intangible" or "symbolic-moralistic" util-
ity that wilderness areas provide.66 A full assessment of the costs of 
development, however, must take into account the reduction in this 
noninstrumental utility, which may be regarded as an externality of 
commercial exploitation. 
The economist's solution is to internalize the externality by giv-
ing preservation benefits and other noninstrumental uses a fair mar-
ket price. Heller suggests that we determine how much 
preservationists will pay for an "increase in the industry output of 
preservation services."67 This would measure the economic surplus 
that preservationist policies produce. That surplus represents the 
"difference between what preservationists would be willing to pay 
and what they do pay for the preservation use of the resources."68 
This surplus could then be balanced, together with the other costs, 
against the benefits of vacation home development. 69 
The outcome of such a cost-benefit analysis will depend upon 
which views the analyst deems worthy of pricing.70 If the analyst is 
an environmentalist, he or she may give the citizen preferences of 
environmentalists a high price; an economist working for industry 
may set a lower price. Other technical problems arise. How can the 
analyst tell whether an individual speaks the truth in response to a 
questionnaire when the individual knows that his response is likely 
66. Id 
61. Id at 399. 
68. Id at 404 (footnote omitted). 
69. See note 49 supra. Also, consider the following example. How much would the indi-
vidual environmentalist pay for the satisfaction or peace of mind he finds in the knowledge 
that pelicans are protected, and that he has helped to protect them? Suppose the average 
environmentalist would pay one or two dollars to preserve pelicans. When you multiply this 
by the millions and millions of Americans who would pay that much, you come out with a 
large sum. This kind of economic reckoning might go a long way to justify even such seem-
ingly diseconomic laws as the Endangered Species Act. 
70. Shall the economist price "adaptive" preferences, that is, preferences inspired by ad-
vertising or otherwise foisted onto the individual rather than actively chosen by him? See 
Elster, lltilitarianism and the Genesis of Wants, in BEYOND UTILITARIANISM (A. Sen. & B. 
Williams eds.) (publication forthcoming); Peston, Changing Utility Functions, in EsSAYS IN 
MATIIEMATICAL ECONOMICS 233 (M. Shubik ed. 1967). 
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to influence public policy? It would make more sense for the indi-
vidual to overstate his willingness to pay for a policy that he ap-
proves since he will not be required actually to pay that much 
money.71 Likewise, the individual may lie on a questionnaire be-
cause it threatens his or her "cherished illusion" that elected officials 
and not bureaucrats should make public policy.72 These and other 
theoretical problems vex efforts to extend cost-benefit analysis be-
yond values for which markets exist and are appropriate.73 
Cost-benefit analysis, nevertheless, may play a useful role in sup-
plementing or informing political decision making.74 Some econo-
mists go one step further, however, and suggest that their method75 
provides a better framework for decision making than can be found 
within the political process.76 These economists argue that cost-bene-
fit analysis provides a better measure of both our "private" and 
"public" wants than does political argument. The political process, 
they argue, is less precise and less able to take into account all of our 
relevant desires. Some economists may suggest, then, that they are 
71. Heller argues that the nonconsumption consumer surplus might be considerable, al-
though he concedes that problems may arise in "the regulatory agency's attempt to discover a 
surrogate measure of the value of each of the components of preservation surplus." Heller, 
supra note 45, at 408. One might wonder, for example, whether support for legislation is a true 
indication of the consumer surplus or of willingness to pay. This is a difficult question, yet 
Heller finds it not insurmountable. The value of preservation, based on various measures, may 
be shown to exceed the threshhold value of consumer surplus realized by development. "A 
widely shared environmental ethic, even if made up of a small willingness to pay per individ-
ual, could, in the aggregate, exceed this threshhold value." Id 
72. Some critics have argued that whatever cost-benefit analysis contributes to public deci-
sion making is not worth the unhappiness experienced by citizens who believe that policy 
should be made on the basis of right or wrong and not on the basis of benefits and costs. See 
Cuyler, The Quality of L!fe and the Limits of Cost-Benefit Analysis, in PUBLIC ECONOMICS AND 
THE QUALITY OF LIFE 141 (L. Wingo & A. Evans eds. 1977); Tarasovsky, Cost-Benefit Analy-
sis, Cherished Illusion and Anxiety: An Aspect of the Hickey Effect; in FRONTIERS IN ECONOM-
ICS (G. Tullock ed. 1976); Williams, Cost-Benefit Analysis: Bastard Science? And/or Insidious 
Poison in the Body Politick?, 1 J. PUB. ECON. 199 (1972). 
73. For a useful survey of these problems, see A. FREEMAN, THE BENEFITS OF ENVIRON-
MENTAL IMPROVEMENT 85-107 (1979); P. SELF, supra note 54, at 97-149; Nash, The Theory of 
Social Cost Measurement, in THE VALUATION OF SOCIAL COST 8 (D. Pearce ed. 1978). 
74. Cost-benefit analysis should be seen as a response to political failure, not market fail-
ure. I have argued this thesis elsewhere, but it is implied by this discussion. See Sagoff, Con-
sumers, Citizens, and the Environment (unpublished manuscript} (on file with the Michigan 
Law Review). 
75. Economists have not yet perfected a theory of shadow pricing. A number of difficulties 
remain. First, who chooses the values worthy of being priced? It is likely that economists will 
price only the values that they consider worth weighing. A second difficulty arises in setting 
the dollar figure. One might wonder, for example, whether the dollar figure offered by an 
environmentalist in response to a hypothethical question is a true indication of the value of a 
policy. The values that economists are dealing with are so conjectural that they are easily 
manipulated. For a third criticism of the theory, see note 51 supra. 
76. Some writers believe that political decisions should be limited to questions concerning 
the fair distribution of wealth; all other governmental problems relate to the efficiency of mar-
kets. See, e.g., A. OKUN, supra note 10, at 32-64. 
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better able than legislators to define the national will.77 
I shall be concerned, in the rest of this essay, with the idea that 
economic analysis can replace political argument and decision. I 
shall be particularly concerned with the notion that economists can 
take account of "public" wants by pricing them. I argue that Con-
gress, and not cost-benefit analysts, should reflect public values and 
convictions in legislation, and that environmental legislation must 
do something more than merely correct market deficiencies. My 
chief criticism of the attempts to measure public values by economic 
methods is that they purport to do something that is conceptually 
impossible. I argue in Part III that economists who attempt to price 
beliefs as if they were benefits and convictions as if they were costs 
commit a logical mistake. 
III 
Economic methods cannot supply the information necessary to 
justify public policy. Economics can measure the intensity with 
which we hold our beliefs; it cannot evaluate those beliefs on their 
merits. Yet such evaluation is essential to political decision making. 
This is my greatest single criticism of cost-benefit analysis. The 
many problems involved in applying the concept of shadow pricing78 
are secondary, because the concept itself rests on a mistake. 
To recognize this mistake, we must first understand what it is that 
economists attempt to measure. If they measure consumer interests, 
market data are appropriate and relevant. The pricing mechanism 
can suggest when resources used to satisfy certain wants might be 
more efficiently employed to satisfy others. When economists ap-
proach issues that concern us as citizens, however, they do not, as 
they should, abandon the pricing mechanism. They believe that they 
can account for citizen-preferences as well as consumer-preferences 
by determining their dollar value. They do this, for example, by ask-
ing citizens what they would pay for a certain level of environmental 
protection. But this attempt to measure the convictions or values of 
citizens by pricing them as market externalities confuses what the 
individual wants as an individual and what he or she, as a citizen, 
believes is best for the community.79 
77. For this suggestion in relation to environmental policy, see the literature cited in note 1 
supra. 
78. See, e.g., note 75 supra. 
79. For literature describing this confusion and its consequences see P. SELF, supra note 
54; Plamenatz, Interests, 2 POL. STUD. 1 (1954); Wildavsky, The Political Economy of Efficiency: 
Cost-Benefit Analysis, Systems Analysis, and Program Budgeting, 26 Pun. ADMIN. REV. 228 
(1966). 
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This confusion involves what logicians call a category-mistake. 80 
One makes a category-mistake by treating facts or concepts as if they 
belong to one logical type or category, when they actually belong to 
another.81 Several examples are illustrative. It is logically correct to 
predicate whiteness of snow or even of coal. (It may not be true, but 
it is intelligible.) To say that the square root of four is white, how-
ever, makes no sense because it is impossible meaningfully to predi-
cate color of a number. When two concepts are in different 
categories, one cannot measure the first by methods that are appro-
priate only to the second. Similarly, although the average American 
household may consist of 2.75 individuals,82 this does not mean that 
such a household exists somewhere in America. A person who in-
quires about the address of the average American family asks an 
absurd question, and commits a category-mistake. 
Private and public preferences also belong to different logical cat-
egories. Public "preferences" do not involve desires or wants, but 
opinions or beliefs. They state what a person believes is best or right 
for the community or group as a whole. These opinions or beliefs 
may be true or false, and we may meaningfully ask the individual 
for the reasons that he or she holds them. But an economist who 
asks how much citizens would pay for opinions that they advocate 
through political association commits a category-mistake. The econ-
omist asks of objective beliefs a question that is appropriate only to 
subjective wants. 
When an environmentalist argues that we ought to preserve wil-
derness areas because of their cultural importance and symbolic 
meaning, he or she states a conviction and not a desire. 83 When an 
80. For a technical explanation of the concept ofa category-mistake, see Ryle, Categories, 
in EsSAYS ON Lome AND LANGUAGE 65 (A. Flew ed. 1953). For a less technical treatment, 
see G. RYLE, THE CONCEPT OF MIND 16-18 (1966). 
81. See G. RYLE, supra note 80, at 16. 
82. N.Y. Times, May 26, 1981, at l, col. 2. 
83. Society rests on shared convictions, which, like Plato's "good lie," hold it together as a 
society. See PLATO'S REPUBLIC 42-62 (G. Grube trans. 1974 ). Convictions about nature -
about what is "pure" and what is "dangerous," what counts as "safe" and what as "pollution" 
- are shared beliefs of this sort. These convictions rest on meaning and symbol systems that 
constitute our common cultural heritage and distinguish it, say, from the Balinese or Lele 
cultures. Anthropologists have argued that it is impossible for a society to replace these mean-
ing or symbol systems with a system of objective economic and scientific analysis: 
We should be able to see that we can never ask for a future society in which we can only 
believe in real, scientifically proved pollution dangers. We must talk threateningly about 
time, money, God and nature ifwe hope to get anything done. We must believe in the 
limitations and boundaries of nature which our community projects. 
M. DOUGLAS, IMPLICIT MEANINGS 245-46 (1975). I have argued elsewhere that one reason to 
preserve wilderness is that the distinction between it and civilization is crucial to our culture: 
that to destroy our remaining wilderness would be to destroy an important basis for this dis-
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economist asserts that we ought to attain efficient levels of pollution, 
he or she, too, states a belief. Both beliefs are to be supported by 
arguments, not by money. One cannot establish the validity of these 
beliefs by pricing them, nor can that mechanism measure their im-
portance to society as a whole. One can judge how strongly people 
hold their beliefs by asking how much they would pay to see them 
implemented, but that is not how we make policy decisions. Those 
who think that Creationism should be taught in the public schools, 
for example, are able to raise a lot of money. But the amount of 
money that partisans raise does not demonstrate the merit of their 
position. A person who wants his or her child taught a particular 
doctrine is free to pay for that; willingness to pay may correctly 
measure the strength of that desire. When a person advocates a pol-
icy as being right or appropriate for society as a whole, however, the 
intensity of the desire is no longer relevant. Rather, advocates must 
present arguments that convince the public or its representatives to 
adopt a policy.84 Political decision makers judge ideas on their mer-
its, and make decisions based on what is good for us all. These 
policymakers may consider economic factors, but they should not 
use the economic method to evaluate competing beliefs. 
The distinction between public and private interests is indispens-
able to the study of political philosophy. "To abolish the distinc-
tion," as one commentator has written, "is to make a shambles of 
political science by treating things that are different as if they were 
alike."85 Markets are the appropriate arena for the competition of 
private interests. This competition may best be understood and regu-
lated in terms of individual willingness to pay. When one advocates 
not a special or private interest but what one describes as the public 
interest or the interest of all, however, the framework of debate com-
pletely changes. Public discussion must then be carried on in public 
terms. 86 The issue is no longer to measure the stake that the individ-
ual has in his proposal; indeed, the larger the individual's private 
tinction and, therefore, an important basis of our common culture. See Sagoff, On Preserving 
the Natural Environment, 84 YALE LJ. 205 (1974). 
84. For example, when Professor Friedman advocated a voucher system in education, see 
M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 9, at 85-107, no one asked him how much he would pay to see that 
policy implemented. The question would have been inappropriate because he was not expres-
sing a consumer preference; a voucher system would probably not affect his children. Rather, 
he was proposing what he thought would be good for society. He was presenting an idea, to be 
judged on its merits, concerning what we should do about public education. It is my thesis that 
cost-benefit analysis has no plausible way of assessing ideas of this kind or taking them into 
account. 
85. E. SCHATISCHNEIDER, THE SEMISOVEREIGN PEOPLE 27 (1960). 
86. Id. 
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stake, the more suspect is his public . pretension. What matters is 
whether the argument that he or she offers is sound. 
This is not to say that economic data are irrelevant in public deci-
sion making. It is to argue that the satisfaction of revealed prefer-
ences is only one goal among others that policymakers must take 
into account. And willingness to pay, as opposed to ability to argue, 
is not a method for making this choice. Costs and benefits, of course, 
are important - there are economic constraints. But this does not 
show that cost-benefit analysis provides an appropriate framework 
for testing the legitimacy of law. 
The blurring of the distinction between public and private inter-
est - and, therefore, between the competition of preferences and the 
contradiction of ideas - produces results that we should do well to 
avoid. First, the policymaker, employing the willingness-to-pay cri-
terion, attempts to remain neutral among contending positions. As a 
result, the analyst must grant equal credibility to every position, no 
matter how bizarre or preposterous. This approach, indeed, may 
favor the silliest views over the more sensible ones since extreme 
opinions often generate the most emotion. 87 An analyst can avoid 
this result only by abandoning neutrality, e.g., by screening the polit-
ical opinions to which he or she is willing to assign a price. 88 
Second, the willingness-to-pay approach to public policy 
removes the basis of legitimacy from the political process. I do not 
mean merely that it crushes the "cherished illusion" that policy 
comes from the minds of elected officials in Congress rather than 
from the computers of economists in the back room. 89 I refer, rather, 
to the fact that cost-benefit approaches deal only with values or pref-
erences already extant in society. A political process - a process of 
debate and compromise - is supposed to be creative.90 The ability 
of the political process to change values and to rise above self-inter-
87. Advocates can find moral arguments to support each side of any controversial issue. If 
the analyst "prices" these views by willingness-to-pay criteria, he or she tests not the rightness 
of the view, nor the reason for it, but the intensity with which it is held. This would favor the 
worst views over the best in a world where ''the best lack all conviction, while the worst are full 
of passionate intensity." W.B. YEATS, "The Second Coming,'' in THE COLLECTED POEMS OF 
W.B. YEATS 185 (1956). 
88. See note 49 supra. 
89. See note 72 supra. 
90. This is especially true with respect to environmental policy since new ideas, options, 
and alternatives often play an essential role. The importance of coming up with new ap-
proaches and alternatives, rather than choosing among preexisting positions and preferences, 
has called forth a new profession of environmental mediation. For a description of this inter-
esting mix of private and public approaches to conflict management, see Gladwin, Patterns of 
Environmental Conflict Over Industrial Facilities in the United States, 1970-78, 20 NAT. RE-
SOURCES J. 243, 263 n.16 (1980), and sources cited therein. 
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est is crucial to its legitimacy. Political leaders are supposed to edu-
cate and elevate public opinion; they are not supposed merely to 
gratify preexisting desires. 
A third likely consequence in public policy may be the most 
disastrous. Economic analysis limits conflict to those parties who 
have something at stake for which they are willing to pay. This ap-
proach would prevent the socialization of conflict that is crucial to 
the functioning of a democracy.91 Consider an example. Suppose a 
corporation proposes and an environmentalist group opposes the 
building of a shopping center in a rural area just outside of town. 
An economist might make a recommendation based upon prices as-
signed to the various wants or preferences of relevant interest 
groups. This would effectively limit conflict to the immediate par-
ties. The genius of democracy, however, is to let the conflict spread 
to a larger audience. The institutions of democratic government -
legislatures, agencies, parties, courts, and the press - depend and 
thrive on the potential for conflicts of this kind to widen beyond 
their original bounds.92 This happens when one side -usually the 
side that otherwise would be defeated - finds a public issue (e.g. , a 
"snail darter'') and moves the conflict into the press, the legislature, 
and the courts. The shopping center may then never be built be-
cause it takes so long to work through the resulting political process. 
This might seem grossly inefficient to economists, and perhaps it 
is, but it is what democratic government is all about.93 An alterna-
tive - technocracy - quarantines or localizes conflict so that it may 
be resolved by the application of some mechanical rule or decision 
procedure. Cost-benefit approaches to public policy, if taken to their 
extreme, would do this, and thus they would make useless the insti-
tutions of democratic government. Cost-benefit analysis localizes 
conflict among affected individuals and prevents it from breaking 
open into the public realm. This suggests that the reason that indus-
try favors economic approaches to public policy is not necessarily the 
obvious one, namely, that cost-benefit analysis is sensitive to the 
91. See E. SCHATISCHNEIDER, supra note 85, at 1-19. 
92. Id. at 13. Consider, for example, the role of the courts in a nation that makes economic 
efficiency the sole criterion for public policy. Conflict could arise only over the question 
whether some preference or view received a reasonable shadow price. This conflict itself, how-
ever, would reveal or involve preferences that would have to be priced. And so on. Thus a 
conflict might spread in such a regime to require an infinite regress of cost-benefit analyses. 
93. Democratic institutions notoriously function in this way to expand the bounds of envi-
ronmental conflicts. See L. CALDWELL, L. HAYES & I. MACWHIRTER, CITIZENS AND THE 
ENVIRONMENT (1976); H. FEIVESON, F. SINDEN & I( SOCOLOW, BOUNDARIES OF ANALYSIS: 
AN INQUIRY INTO THE TOCKS ISLAND DAM CONTROVERSY (1976); B. GIBBONS, WYE ISLAND: 
OUTSIDERS, INSIDERS, AND THE RESISTANCE TO CHANGE (1977). 
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costs of regulation. The deeper reason may be that cost-benefit anal-
ysis defines a framework for conflict that keeps the public qua public 
and the citizen qua citizen out. 
Once we recognize the logical difference between wants and be-
liefs, it becomes clear that cost-benefit analysis can measure only the 
former. To conduct such an analysis, the economist asks how much 
we would pay for certain policies. How much would you pay to save 
Lange's metalmark? How much would you pay to preserve the qual-
ity of the air in the Southwest? Our responses indicate only the de-
gree to which we care about the issues. If the analyst prices these 
views by willingness-to-pay criteria, or makes any similar economic 
trade-off, he tests neither the validity of the views nor the reasons for 
them, but only the intensity with which they are held. 
Economic efficiency is usually defined in terms of the maximum 
satisfaction of the wants or preferences of individuals in the order 
that those individuals rank them.94 A market in which competition is 
perfect, in theory, achieves this kind of efliciency.95 Under this ap-
proach, the market would determine optimal policies, and the gov-
ernment would be concerned primarily with market failure.96 Cost-
benefit analysis, insofar as it reflects or shadows markets,97 provides 
a technique by which society may attempt to determine policies that 
are economically e.ffi.cient.98 But why should we think economic effi-
94. See C. SCHULTZE, THE PUBLIC USE OF PRIVATE INTEREST 1-2 (1977). 
95. Id at 16-27. 
96. As Frank Michelman has written: "In the economic vision, it is only the prospect of 
overcoming the market's failure to capture gains from trade that can justify, from the individ-
ual's standpoint, the risks of exploitation inherent in majoritarian political institutions." 
Michelman, Politics and Values or What's Really Wrong with Rationality Review?, 13 CREIGH-
TON L. REV. 487, 498 (1979). Michelman draws from his argument the logical conclusion: 
"Would it not, then, make economic sense to include in the constitution a direction to the 
courts to nullify any majoritarian intervention which plainly cannot even make a pretense of 
being a solution to a market-failure problem?" Id at 498-99. For a fuller treatment, see 
Michelman, Constitutions, Statutes, and the Theory of Efficient Adjudication, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 
431 (1980). 
97. It is impossible to provide a mathematical function that is nondictatorial and logically 
consistent by which the transitive preference-maps of individuals can be transformed into a 
single ordering of social preferences. This is a theoretical reason that leads economists to 
appeal to markets, rather than to mathematics, to replace majoritarian political institutions as 
a methodology for arriving at and justifying collective choice. See K. ARRow, SOCIAL CHOICE 
AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (2d ed. 1963). 
98. The fundamental assumption, when spelled out in detail, is this: when competition is 
perfect (f.e., when there are no "unpriced" costs), markets are more representative and demo-
cratic institutions than any political arrangement. Government should, therefore, limit its role 
to that of "perfecting" competition by mitigating market failure. Thus, 
relations in the market are a form of unanimous-consent arrangement. When dealing 
with each other in a buy-sell transaction, individuals can act voluntarily on the basis of 
mutual advantage. Organizing large-scale social activity through the alternative open to a 
free society - democratic majoritarian politics - necessarily implies some minority who 
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ciency is an important goal?99 Why should we take wants or prefer-
ences more seriously than beliefs and opinions?100 Why should we 
base public policy on the model of a market transaction rather than 
the model of a political debate?101 
disapprove of each particular decision. Everything else being equal, unanimous-consent 
arrangements are much more attractive politically than any alternative. 
C Schultze,supra note 94, at 16-17 (footnote omitted). See M. FRIEDMAN,supra note 9, at 13, 
14. It is an arguable point that a market, in theory, is a unanimous consent arrangement that 
leads to or assures an efficient distribution of whatever is marketed. This has led economists to 
believe that any social decision that is efficient is one that carries the consent of the public, 
whether that decision is reached through a market or by cost-benefit analysis "in the back 
room." This misses the important fact that the reason that markets are efficient is that people 
participate voluntarily in them, not the other way around. Thus the fact that consent leads to 
or assures efficiency (at least in principle) in free and fair markets does not imply that effi-
ciency (however achieved, e.g., by a dictator) has consent. 
99. Two popular answers may be dismissed. Some people would argue that the satisfac-
tion of preferences produces satisfaction in the sense of pleasure, well-being, or happiness, so 
that market approaches to public policy may be justified in relation to the ethical theory of 
utilitarianism. To argue this way, however, is only to be misled by an ambiguity in the term 
"satisfaction." Preferences are satiflied in the same sense that equations or conditions are satis-
fied; in other words, they are met. Whether this leads to satisfaction in the sense of happiness 
or well-being, however, is an empirical question upon which little research has been done. It is 
possible, on the contrary, that the satisfaction of preference leads to frustration or disillusion, 
while the al/empt to fulfill desire, as long as it is unsuccessful, is satisfying. See J. KEATS, 
"Ode on a Grecian Um," in COMPLETE POEMS AND SELECTED LETTERS 352 (C. Thorpe ed. 
1935). 
Second, one may argue that the satisfaction of preference, whether or not it contributes to 
happiness, adds to freedom, for freedom is getting what you want and doing as you like, This 
is true, however, only insofar as we act upon values that we believe, all things considered and 
upon reflection, are appropriate or right. A person is not free, in other words, when he acts 
upon a compulsion or an addiction, even if there is a market, e.g., in heroin, alcohol, and 
cigarettes. The values that we consider after reflection to be right or appropriate, however, 
may be those that we pursue not in a market but through the political process. They may be -
and often are - other-regarding or citizen preferences. See Watson, Free Agency, 72 J. PHIL. 
205 (1975); Wolf,Asymmetrical Freedom, 11 J. PHIL. 151 (1980). 
100. The literature of economics recognizes that institutions that encourage integration and 
discourage alienation in society may be more important than institutions that lead to effi-
ciency. Thus, Tarasovsky points out that when individuals in a society know that cost-benefit 
analysis or some other "rational" decision-making procedure has replaced old fashioned poli-
tics as the source of collective choices, they are likely to experience alienation as their cher-
ished illusions are exploded. See Tarasovsky, supra note 72. Economists might place a 
"shadow'' price on the pain and alienation that individuals experience when they know that 
political representatives are taking their cue from the economists in the back room. This price 
might be sufficient to show that people hate cost-benefit analysis so much that its result is 
always inefficient. For further discussion of the issue of alienation and economics see P. SELF, 
supra note 54; R. TITMUSS, THE GIFT RELATIONSHIP (1971); R. TITMUSS, CHOICE AND THE 
''WELFARE STATE" (1967) (Fabian Socy. Tract No. 370). 
101. Arrow and Hahn put the principle this way: 
There is by now a lonti and fairly imposing line of economists from Adam Smith to the 
present who have sought to show that a decentralized economy motivated by self-interest 
and guided by price signals would be compatible with a coherent disposition of economic 
resources that could be regarded, in a well-defined sense, as superior to a large class of 
possible alternative dispositions. 
K. ARROW & F. HAHN, GENERAL COMPETITIVE ANALYSIS vi-vii (1971). Duncan Kennedy 
notes three reasons for the conclusion that a freely functioning, decentralized economy moti-
vated by self-interest is superior to centralized planning or direction by the state. First is the 
notion that the invisible hand will transform apparent selfishness into public benefit. Second is 
the "clenched teeth idea," i.e., however bad the results of self-interested individualistic behav-
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What many economists do not understand is that efficiency is one 
value among many and is not a meta-value that comprehends all 
others.102 Economists as a rule do recognize one other value, 
namely, justice or equality, and they speak, therefore, of a "trade-
o.fr' between efficiency and equality. 103 They do not speak, as they 
should, however, about the trade-off between efficiency and our aes-
thetic and moral values. What about the trade-off between efficiency 
and dignity, efficiency and self-respect, efficiency and the magnifi-
cence of our natural heritage, efficiency and the quality of life? 
These are the trade-offs that are important in setting environmental 
policy. 
If we were to pursue efficiency as our goal in environmental pol-
icy, I believe that we would quickly tum all of our natural beauty 
into commercial blight. This is what happens when self-fueling and 
irreversible consumer markets have their way.104 To forestall this 
result by "pricing" beliefs, values, and ideals as if they were con-
sumer benefits, I have argued, is to commit a category-mistake. 105 
Cost-benefit analysis, at that point, disintegrates into storytelling; it 
becomes a bad exercise in ad hoc justification. 
I do not pretend to assess the merits of the argument that I have 
made here. I only want to point out that it is an attempt at argu-
ment. I did not treat the position that economists defend as if it were 
ior, a worse evil would result if the state attempted to suppress it. A third argument separates 
"Jaw" from "morality," and insists that the state should remain neutral among competing con-
ceptions of the good in order to respect the rights of individuals who live by these conceptions. 
Kennedy, Fonn and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685, 1716 
(1976). 
For a defense of these arguments, see 3 F. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION, AND LIBERTY 65-97 
(1979); F. HAYEK, supra note 9, at 220-33; F. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM 32-42, 56-71, 
88-100 (1944). For criticism, see L. ROBBINS, POLITICS AND ECONOMICS 91-112 (1963). For 
useful discussions of these arguments as they appear in administrative law, see Breyer,Analyz-
ing Regulatory Failure: Mismatches, Less Restrictive Alternatives, and Refonn, 92 HARV. L. 
REV. 547 (1979); Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 
1667 (1975). 
102. Schultze allows that economic analysts propose and advocate efficiency as a goal just 
as others might propose and advocate other goals. "Analysts . . • can and should play the role 
of • . . 'partisan efficiency advocates' - the champions of analysis and efficiency. They are 
indeed partisans, and the ultimate decision-maker has to balance their voice against the polit-
ical, tactical, and other considerations . . . ." C. SCHULTZE, THE POLITICS AND ECONOMICS 
OF PUBLIC SPENDING 96 (1968). Schultze's frank acknowledgment that efficiency is one value 
among others contrasts sharply with economists' usual view that efficiency is the result of max-
imizing the satisfaction of all present values. James Buchanan explains the usual view as fol-
lows: ''This characteristic behavior of the political economist is, or should be, ethically neutral; 
the indicated results are influenced by his own value scale only insofar as this reflects his 
membership in the larger group." Buchanan, Positive Economics, Welfare Economics, and Polit-
ical Economy, 2 J. L. & EcoN. 124, 127 (1959). 
103. See A. OKUN, supra note IO. 
104. See generally P. BLAKE, Goo's OWN JUNKYARD (1964). 
105. See notes 80-82 supra and accompanying text. 
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merely their private preference. I did not survey economists to find 
out how much they were willing to pay to have their views imple-
mented. Why, then, do economists survey environmentalists to find 
out how much they would pay to keep a vista clear or a river pure? 
Why do economists believe that opinions that oppose theirs deserve 
a price and not a reply? 106 
The environmental legislation of the last twenty years has con-
sistently indicated our preference for national policies that respond 
to concerns other than economic efficiency. This legislation rejects 
markets as the indicator of the national will. There is nothing in this 
legislation or in the public debate on environmental protection that 
remotely suggests that most people regard pollution as a problem 
only because pollution is inefficient. Rather, we regard it it as a 
problem because it is efficient.107 The "gospel of efficiency" 108 is 
now as anachronistic as is the Lochner 109 decision that is its most 
typical expression. 
CONCLUSION 
Environmental law poses a severe test for economic approaches 
to public policy. "Disagreements over degrees of environmental 
protection," one writer has correctly surmised, "are not about rela-
tive costs and benefits but about the validity of economics itself as a 
form of interaction - its basis in exchange, costs, and cash - as a 
measure of the way we ought to relate to one another."110 To notice 
that the Endangered Species Act is not cost-beneficial is to recognize 
the obvious. That is the point of the Act, and of much of our envi-
ronmental legislation. These laws demonstrate that we are not con-
sumers bent on satisfying every subjective preference. We are that, 
of course, but we are citizens as well. And, as citizens, we insist upon 
a model of government and a vision of political life that allow us to 
106. This criticism differs from Tribe's concern about the "dwarfing" of "soft" variables. 
See Tribe, Ways Not lo Think About Plastic Trees: New Foundations/or Environmental Law, 
83 YALE L.J. 1315, 1318-19 (1974). 
107. Compare child labor laws. The reason to oppose child labor is not that it is inefficient 
(a perfect market might encourage it), but that it uses children as a means to promote effi-
ciency. It would be better to treat them as ends in themselves. This is the problem with policies 
based on the maximization of efficiency. They treat individuals as having equal worth because 
they treat them as having no worth: the individual becomes a mere factor in the overall pro-
duction of utility, welfare, or wealth. See Hart, Between Utility and Rights, 79 CoLUM. L. REV, 
828, 830 (1979). 
108. Sees. HAYS, CONSERVATION AND THE GOSPEL OF EFFICIENCY: THE PROGRESSIVE 
CONSERVATION MOVEMENT, 1890-1920 (1959). 
109. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
110. A. WILDAVSKY, supra note 47, at 202. 
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posit collective values and to give effect to our common will. 111 
The role of the policymaker and of the legislature may be to bal-
ance what we believe in and stand for as a community with what we 
want and need as a functioning economy. We must devise some way 
to relate to each other as citizens in search of common ideals and, at 
the same time, to compete with each other in a market to satisfy 
individual interests. The future of environmental policy rests on the 
resolution of this conflict. A solution must do more than merely al-
low us to balance interests with interests; it must facilitate the bal-
ancing of interests with morality and one morality with another 
morality. 112 Economists would do well to show us how this sort of 
balancing is to be done. 
111. A brief examination of President Reagan's policy is appropriate here. By Executive 
Order, the President has forbidden federal agencies to undertake any regulatory action ''unless 
the potential benefits to society from the regulation outweigh the potential costs to society 
.... " Executive Order Number 12,291 is titled Federal Regulation and was issued in Febru-
ary. 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (1981). 
The Order requires that every "major rule" be accompanied by a Regulatory Impact Anal-
ysis, which shall contain the following information: 
(l) A description of the potential benefits of the rule, including any beneficial effects that 
cannot be quantified in monetary terms, and the identification of those likely to receive 
the benefits; 
(2) A description of the potential costs of the rule, including any adverse effects that can-
not be quantified in monetary terms, and the identification of those likely to bear the costs 
Id at 13,194. This Order makes economic efficiency the overriding goal of regulatory policy. 
The laws that the agencies are supposed to enforce, however, set other prioriµes. Many of 
these laws are intended to improve air and water quality, the safety of the workplace, the 
reliability of consumer products, and to achieve other objectives that appeal to us as a nation. 
See note 37 supra. Most of us may agree with the President that agencies should be en-
couraged to choose among "approaches to any given regulatory objective, the alternative in-
volving the least net cost to society .... " Id at 13,193. It does not follow from this, however, 
that the regulatory agencies should pursue economic efficiency instead of the goals or objec-
tives that Congress has legislated. The Order may recognize this, for it directs agencies to 
conform to the Order "to the extent permitted by law." Id at 13,194. 
But the Order raises a second point. In theory, we are not precluded from democratically 
deciding that efficiency should be our overriding goal. We should be as free to disregard our 
noneconomic values as we are to override our economic ones. But we must make that choice 
ourselves; economists cannot make it for us. 
For an excellent analysis oflegal and normative issues raised by Executive Order 12,291, 
see M. Rosenberg, Presidential Control of Agency Rulemaking: An Analysis of Constitutional 
Issues That May Be Raised By Executive Order 12,291 (1981) (unpublished manuscript on file 
with the Michigan Law Review). 
112. A similar point is made by Kennedy, supra note 101, at 1731. 
